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Abstract
Shotguns clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of part-
nerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of oeror typ-
ically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric infor-
mation setting, unequal and inecient outcomes occur with an unassigned
oeror. Experimental results are aligned with our theory.
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Deadlocks or impasses between joint owners concerning fundamental business deci-
sions can paralyze closely-held companies including partnerships and LLCs. When
a business relationship deteriorates to the point where the joint owners cannot be
reconciled, it may become necessary to dissolve the business venture and/or to dis-
sociate one (or more) of the owners. Placing an accurate value on the business assets
{ a necessary step in nalizing a business divorce { can be dicult, especially when
the best wisdom concerning the value of the assets is in the minds of the business
owners themselves, and an outside market for the assets does not exist.
In a shotgun mechanism, one owner names a single buy-sell price and the other
owner then decides whether to sell or buy at that price. Shotgun provisions are
fairly common in the private business agreements of partnerships and LLCs.1 In
the words of Judge Frank Easterbrook, \[t]he possibility that the person naming
the price can be forced either to buy or to sell keeps the rst mover honest."2 In
private contractual settings, the identity of the oeror is typically not specied, i.e.,
the role of oeror remains unassigned.
Shotgun mechanisms are sometimes mandated by judges when overseeing busi-
ness divorce proceedings. In Kinzie v. Dells, a recent business deadlock case from
Canada,3 the presiding judge describes the appropriate assignment of the role of
oeror: \In a `shot gun' sale, the court must determine the party who will make the
rst oer. Normally, the party who is in the best position to assess the value of the
business and determine the fair market value is ordered to make the initial oer."
This article theoretically and experimentally studies shotgun mechanisms in a
common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting. When the role of oeror
remains unassigned, coordination failures arise and unequal and inecient outcomes
are obtained.4 Equitable and ecient outcomes are achieved only when the role of
1These mechanisms may also be referred to as Texas shootouts, Russian roulette, Chinese wall
clauses, put-call options, dynamite or candy bar methods, or simply buy-sell mechanisms (Carey,
2005). See Crawford (1977), Che and Hendershott (2008), and De Frutos and Kittsteiner (2008).
See also our previous work and the references cited there (Brooks et al., 2010).
2Valinote v. Ballis; 295, F3d. 666 (Ill. 2002).
3Kinzie v. Dells 2010 BCSC 1360 (Can. B.C.). Shotgun mechanisms are rare in the United
States, but see Fulk v. Washington Serv. Assocs. No. 17747-NC, 2002 BL 1389 (Del. Ch. June
21, 2002). See Landeo and Spier (forthcoming, (a) and (b)).
4Landeo and Spier (forthcoming, (a) and (b)) and Brooks et al. (2010) do not study shotgun
1oeror is assigned to the better-informed party. It may be dicult for the owners
to adequately assign the role of oeror in the shotgun provision. The identity of the
better-informed party in the event of deadlock is frequently unforeseeable ex ante.
In contrast, the ex post feature of the judicial implementation of the mechanism
might allow courts to identify the better-informed party and properly assign the
role of oeror.
2 Theoretical Framework
Suppose that two co-venturers5 own equal stakes in a rm with uncertain value
x, which is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [xL;xH]. x is the
average value. The informed player (Owner 1) knows the true value of x; the
uninformed owner (Owner 2) does not observe the value. Thus, this game has
one-sided asymmetric information with common values. We assume that there is
a business deadlock; the assets will be more valuable if ownership is consolidated.
Resolving the deadlock will create an additional a of value, so after the consolidation
of ownership the assets are worth x+a 2 [xL+a;xH +a]. In a shotgun mechanism,
one owner names a single buy-sell price, which we represent as p, and the other
owner is compelled to either buy or sell shares at that named price. If Owner i
purchases Owner j's stake for price p, the payo for Owner i is x + a   p and the
payo for Owner j is p. If the business remains deadlocked, each owner receives x
2.
The equilibrium concept is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
We will show that when the role of oeror is unassigned, inecient outcomes may
result as a consequence of a coordination failure between the owners. To understand
this outcome, it is useful to restate our previous ndings regarding the equilibria
with assigned oerors (Brooks et al., 2010).6 Proposition 1 rst characterizes the
unique fully-separating equilibrium of the shotgun mechanism when the informed
party, Owner 1, makes the buy-sell oer. Owner 1's buy-sell oer fully reveals Owner
1's type x and leads to an equitable division of the surplus.7 Second, it outlines the
mechanisms with unassigned oerors. In a dierent environment, De Frutos and Kittsteiner (2008)
theoretically explore an auction mechanism for assigning the role of oeror.
5According to Hauswald and Hege (2006), 80% of all joint ventures incorporated in the U.S.
between 1985 and 2000 are two-partner joint ventures.
6See our previous work (Brooks et al., 2010) for formal discussion and proofs.
7There also exists a pooling equilibrium where Owner 1 oers p(x) = x+a
2 and Owner 2 mixes
2equilibrium of the shotgun mechanism when the uninformed party, Owner 2, makes
the buy-sell oer. Owner 2's oer reects the average value of the assets rather
than the realized value (since x is known only to Owner 1), and Owner 1 receives a
greater equilibrium share of the surplus than Owner 2.
PROPOSITION 1: First, suppose Owner 1 (the informed party) is assigned the
role of oeror. There is a unique fully-separating equilibrium where Owner 1 oers
p1(x) = x+a
2 and Owner 2 randomizes between buying and selling with equal proba-
bility. The ex ante expected payos of each owner are x+a
2 . Second, suppose Owner
2 (the uninformed party) is assigned the role of oeror. In equilibrium, Owner 2
oers p2 = x+a
2 . Owner 1 sells his stake to Owner 2 when x < x and buys Owner
2's stake when x  x.8 The ex ante expected payos of Owner 1 and Owner 2 are
x+a
2 +
xH xL
8 and x+a
2  
xH xL
8 , respectively.
We now consider the shotgun mechanism with an unassigned oeror. In this
mechanism, the two owners have the option (but not the obligation) to make si-
multaneous buy-sell oers. If only one oer is made, the receiver is compelled to
either buy the stake of the oeror or to sell his own stake. If two oers are made,
a coin ip determines which of the two oers applies. The results of our rst two
propositions suggest a potential conict between the two owners in this setting.
The uninformed player, Owner 2, would prefer that Owner 1 makes the buy-sell
oer since p1(x) = x+a
2 gives Owner 2 an equitable share of the surplus. Owner 1
would prefer that Owner 2 make the buy-sell oer, since receiving p2 = x+a
2 will
allow Owner 1 to exploit his informational advantage.
When the gains from consolidation, a, are suciently large, then there are multi-
ple equilibria. In one equilibrium, Owner 1 makes a perfectly-revealing and equitable
oer p1(x) = x+a
2 and Owner 2 mixes between accepting in rejecting (as in Propo-
sition 1). In a second equilibrium, Owner 2 makes an oer p2 = x+a
2 and Owner 1
buys when x is high and sells if x is low (as in Proposition 1). Interestingly, there
is also a mixed-strategy equilibrium where Owner 2 mixes between making an oer
and does not make one, and Owner 1 oers p1 = x+a
2 if and only if his type, x,
is suciently close to the average type x. In this mixed-strategy equilibrium, it is
between buying and selling with equal likelihood. The expected payos are the same as in the
separating equilibrium.
8Here, we assume that the recipient buys when indierent.
3possible that neither owner makes a buy-sell oer, leaving the gains from trade, a,
unrealized.9 Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibria.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose the role of oeror has not been assigned. If a <
xH xL
4 then Owner 1 (the informed party) makes a buy-sell oer and Owner 2 (the
uninformed party) does not. If a 
xH xL
4 then:
(i) There is an equilibrium where Owner 1 (the informed party) makes an oer and
Owner 2 does not;
(ii) There is an equilibrium where Owner 2 (the uninformed party) makes an oer
and Owner 1 does not; and
(iii) There is a mixed-strategy equilibrium where Owner 2 (the uninformed party)
oers p2 = x+a
2 with probability  and makes no oer with probability 1   . Owner
1 (the informed party) oers p1(x) = x+a
2 when x 2 [x   ;x + ] and does
not make an oer otherwise. The payos of Owner 1 and Owner 2 are x+a
2 +
a
 
   1
2

1   2
xH xL

and x+a
2   a

1
2   
xH xL

, respectively.  2 (0;1) and  2
(0;
xH xL
2 ) exist and solve the following system of two equations: 22   8a =
(xH   xL)2   4a(xH   xL) and  = 2a(1   )=.
PROOF. When a <
xH xL
4 , remaining in the deadlock gives Owner 2 an expected
payo of x
2 which is higher than what he would receive in the role of oeror, x+a
2  
xH xL
8 (see Proposition 1). So Owner 2 will refrain from making a buy-sell oer.
Owner 1, on the other hand, could guarantee himself a payo of x+a
2 > x
2 by oering
p1 = x+a
2 . So Owner 1 makes a buy-sell oer in equilibrium.
Now consider a >
xH xL
4 . Suppose Owner 2 oers p2 = x+a
2 with probability .
Suppose x < x, so Owner 1 would choose to sell when faced with this oer. If Owner
1 does not make an oer, his payo is (1   )(x
2) + ()(x+a
2 ). If Owner 1 makes an
oer p1 = x+a
2 , his payo is (1  
2)(x+a
2 )+(
2)(x+a
2 ). Setting these expressions equal
to each other veries that Owner 1 is indierent between making an oer and not
making an oer when the asset value is x    where  = 2a(1   )=. Similarly,
one can establish indierence for Owner 1 between making an oer and not making
one when the asset value is x + .
Consider Owner 2's decision. If Owner 2 does not make an oer, his payo is
9This outcome might also explain why privately-contracted shotgun clauses are rarely triggered.
See Brooks et al. (2010).
4Z x 
xL
 
x
2

dF(x) +
Z x+
x 
 
x+a
2

dF(x) +
Z xH
x+
 
x
2

dF(x)
where dF(x) = dx
xH xL (since x is uniformly distributed). That is, when the value of
x is at the extremes then Owner 1 will refrain from making an oer and the deadlock
will remain, giving Owner 2 a payo of x
2. When x 2 [x   ;x + ], then Owner
1 oers p1 = x+a
2 and Owner 2 will receive a net payo of x+a
2 . Simplifying, Owner
2's payo is:
x
2
+
a
(xH   xL)
:
Rearranging this expression gives the expression for Owner 2's payo in the propo-
sition. Adding the expected payos for Owners 1 and 2 as stated in the proposition,
one nds that their joint expected payo is: x + a   a(1   )

1   2
xH xL

. That
is, their joint payo is x + a, which is the ecient joint surplus, minus a loss,
a(1   )

1   2
xH xL

, reecting the likelihood that neither owner makes an oer.
This proves the expression for Owner 1's payo in the proposition.
If Owner 2 oers p2 = x+a
2 (which is an optimal oer for Owner 2 given Owner
1's strategy) then Owner 2's expected payo is
Z x 
xL
 
x + a   x+a
2

dF(x) +
Z xH
x+
 
x+a
2

dF(x)
+1
2
Z x
x 
 
x + a   x+a
2

dF(x) + 1
2
Z x+
x
 
x+a
2

dF(x)
+1
2
Z x+
x 
 
x+a
2

dF(x):
The rst two terms reect Owner 2's payo when the asset value x is in the extremes
of the distribution so Owner 1 does not make a buy-sell oer. The second two terms
reect Owner 2's payo when the asset value is in the middle of the distribution and
Owner 2 wins the coin ip and makes the active oer (which happens with proba-
bility 1
2). The last term reects Owner 2's payo in the middle of the distribution
when Owner 1's oer, p1(x) = x+a
2 , is active (which happens with probability 1
2).
Combining and rearranging terms, this expression becomes:
(xH + 3xL)
8
+
a
2
+
2
4(xH   xL)
:
5In equilibrium, Owner 2 is indierent between making an oer and not making an
oer. Setting these two simplied expressions equal to each other and rearranging
terms gives 22   8a = (xH   xL)2   4a(xH   xL) (as in the proposition). This
quadratic equation has two positive roots, one with  smaller than 2a and one with
 larger than 2a. Only the smaller of the two roots has the necessary property that
 2 (0;
xH xL
2 ). 
3 Experimental Evidence
This section reports the results from a series of experiments with human subjects
paid according to their performance. We investigate whether the shotgun mechanism
with an unassigned oeror generates inequitable and inecient outcomes.10 We
consider two treatments: Shotgun mechanisms with an unassigned oeror (NO),
and Shotgun mechanisms with an informed oeror (IO).11
3.1 Numerical Example
Computational demands on the subjects are reduced by using a simple numerical
example. We assume that two co-venturers, Owner 1 (the informed player) and
Owner 2 (the uninformed player), own equal stakes in a rm with uncertain value
x, which is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [$400;$1000]. Due to
business deadlock, consolidated ownership creates an additional value a = $200.12
Thus, the value of the business assets per owner under consolidation is equal to
(x + $200)=2 2 [$300;$600].13 In the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the unassigned-
10Kittsteiner et al. (2012) present an experimental study of privately-contracted shotgun and
auction mechanisms in private-value settings.
11In a previous paper on judicial resolution of deadlocks (Landeo and Spier, forthcoming, (b)),
we studied three conditions: shotguns with informed and uninformed oerors and private auction.
We showed that the IO is equity superior to the other two mechanisms. We decided to use the
data for the IO condition in our current study to construct the qualitative hypothesis regarding
the eects of NO on the likelihood of equitable outcomes. The unassigned-oeror condition was
not explored in our previous paper.
12The value of a allows us to replicate the theoretical environment that triggers multiplicity of
equilibria in the unassigned-oeror environment.
13The experimental setting satises the assumptions of the theory. To ensure control and repli-
cability, only few labels are used to motivate the experimental environment.
6oeror environment (NO), the informed owner should decline to be the oeror for
values of the business assets per owner under consolidation outside the interval
[408;492], i.e., in 72% of the cases; the uninformed owner should be gun shy in
17% of the cases; and hence, both owners should be gun shy in 12% of the cases.
Inecient and unequal outcomes will occur under the mixed-strategy equilibrium of
the NO environment. The hypotheses are as follows.
HYPOTHESIS 1: The shotgun mechanism with an unassigned oeror produces
inecient outcomes.
HYPOTHESIS 2: The shotgun mechanism with an unassigned oeror reduces
the likelihood of equitable outcomes and the payo for the uninformed owner (with
respect to the shotgun mechanism with an informed oeror).
3.2 Games and Sessions
Subjects played 8 practice rounds and 16 actual rounds using networked computer
terminals.14 Before the beginning of the rst actual round, the computer randomly
assigned a role to the subjects: Player 1 or Player 2 (Player 1, the informed player,
was the oeror in the Informed Oeror condition, and both players were potential
oerors in the unassigned-oeror condition). Before the beginning of each actual
round, the computer also randomly formed pairs.15 Subjects were not paired with
the same partner in any two immediately consecutive rounds. Then, the computer
randomly chose the value of the business assets.16 This value was revealed only to
Player 1.17
In the shotgun mechanism with an informed-oeror condition (IO), the subjects
played a two-stage game. In the rst stage, the informed oeror made a buy-sell
14Undergraduate and graduate students at the University of Alberta were recruited from elec-
tronic bulletin boards. Players were completely anonymous to one another. Hence, this exper-
imental environment did not permit the formation of reputations. The purpose of the practice
rounds was to allow subjects to become familiar with the experimental environment. During the
practice rounds, subjects experienced each role four times.
15Given the randomization process used to form pairs, and the diversity of oer categories and
prices that subjects confronted, the sixteen actual rounds do not represent identical repetitions of
the game. Consequently, we can treat each round as a one-shot experience.
16The computer got the realization of the value of the business assets under joint ownership from
the interval [400;1000]. Only even integers were considered.
17Both players knew that Player 1 received this information. See instructions (Appendix).
7oer p  0 to the other subject, who played the role of the oeree. In the second
stage, the oeree was required to respond to the oer by either buying or selling at
the named price. In the unassigned oeror condition (NO), Player 1 and Player 2
simultaneously decided whether to be the oeror and propose a buy-sell price. If
both players decided to be the oeror, the computer randomly allocated the role of
the oeror (with equal likelihood). The oeree then decided whether to buy or to
sell at the proposed price. If neither player decided to be the oeror, joint ownership
was preserved and the game ended.
We ran two sessions (90- and 120-minute sessions, for the IO and NO conditions,
respectively; 36 subjects in total) at the University of Alberta School of Business
computer laboratories.18 The subject pool (undergraduate and graduate students
from the University of Alberta) received their monetary payos in cash ($27 CAD
game earnings, on average) at the end of the session.19 Our laboratory currency,
the \token," was converted to Canadian dollars using a commonly-known exchange
rate (427 tokens =1 Canadian dollar).
3.3 Results
Data Summary
As Figures 1 and 2 indicate,20 informed oerors' proposals made in the IO and
NO conditions exhibited similar patterns: Oers increased with the value of the
business assets, an expected result; and, more (less) equitable oers were observed
for low(high) assets values, an unanticipated nding. Uninformed oerees' behavior
followed the theory (buy rates equal to 44 and 45%, in the IO and NO conditions,
respectively).21 The uninformed oerors' proposals in the NO condition (Figure 3)
were also aligned with the theory (mode oer equal to 450). As expected, informed
oerees sold when asset values were lower than 450 (94% of the cases) and bought
18The number of subjects and observations (number of pairs for the 16 rounds) per condition
are 18 and 144, respectively.
19The participation fee was $10 CAD.
20The gures include information about the observed oers, oers that produce equitable out-
comes (Equitable Buy-Sell Oers), and oers predicted by the theory (Predicted Buy-Sell Oer).
Finally, they include Fitted Values, i.e., predicted linear relationship between the oers and the
asset values that resulted from the application of OLS methods (oer as a function of the asset
value (x + 200)=2).
21The buy rate is dened as the percentage of total pairs in which oerees decided to buy.
8Figure 1: IO Figure 2: NO - Informed Oeror
Figure 3: NO - Uninformed Oeror
when asset values were greater than or equal to 450 (71% of the cases).
Our ndings for the NO condition also indicate that the role of oeror was
assigned to the informed and uninformed owners in 53 and 23% of the cases, re-
spectively. As predicted by the theory, ineciency (i.e., instances in which neither
the informed nor the uninformed owners decided to be the oeror) occurred in the
NO environment. The ineciency rate (24% of total cases) was higher than ex-
pected. Departures from the point predictions regarding gun-shy behavior were also
observed. First, informed and uninformed owners were gun-shy in 33 and 63% of the
cases, respectively. Second, ineciency also occurred in case of asset values inside
the interval [408;492].22
22Informed owners were gun shy inside this interval in 30% of the cases, and made oers outside
the equilibrium interval in 65% of the cases.
9Finally, our data suggest that the NO environment negatively aected the unin-
formed oeror's mean payo, reduced the equitable allocation rate,23 and increased
the ineciency rate (with respect to the IO treatment).24
Ecient Outcomes
In theory, ineciency will occur in the NO environment under the mixed-strategy
equilibrium. Our data indicate that ineciency was present in 24% of the cases (rate
signicantly dierent from zero; p - value < :001).25 Inecient outcomes reect the
gun-shy behavior of the informed and uninformed players. These ndings support
Hypothesis 1.
RESULT 1: The shotgun mechanism with an unassigned oeror generates ine-
cient outcomes.
Equitable Outcomes
We use regression analysis to test the eects of the NO environment on the likelihood
of equitable outcomes and the uninformed owner's payo. Our analysis involves
robust standard errors which account for the possible dependence of observations
within condition. We take pairs of conditions and estimate probit and OLS mod-
els. Each model includes a treatment dummy variable as its regressor and a round
23The equitable outcome rate is dened as the percentage of total pairs involving a 50-50 alloca-
tion (i.e., the uninformed owner's payo is 50% of the sum of payos). For the NO condition, only
consolidated ownership cases, i.e., cases in which one or both owners decided to be the oeror, are
considered.
24Given the consistency of the aggregate data across rounds since early stages, we decided to
include the 16 rounds in our analysis. The qualitative results still hold when only the last 8 rounds
of play are considered. For exposition, rounded values (integers) are presented. The mean asset
values (standard deviation in parentheses) under ownership consolidation are 431 (89) and 441
(83), for the case of the IO and NO conditions, respectively (the asset value dierences between
conditions were not statistically signicant.
25To control for possible non-independence of observations, our binomial one-sided probability
test used the data for the rst actual round only (the ineciency rate was equal to 33% in the
rst round; our ndings also hold if we consider all rounds). The observed inecient rate was
marginally dierent from the theoretical rate (p-value = .083, binomial one-sided test, rst round
data only; the results also hold if we consider all rounds).
10Table 1: Eects of the Shotgun Mechanism with an Unassigned Oeror on the
Probability of Equitable Outcomes and the Uninformed Owner's Mean Payo
(Tests of Dierences between Conditions)
Conditions Prob. Equitable Outcomes Uninf. Owner's Mean Payo
(Marginal Eects) (Coecients)
IO versus NO  0:047  63:535
(0:014) (15:203)
Observations 240 288
Note: The columns report the change in the probability of equitable outcomes and dierence
between the means (uninformed owner's payo) due to the NO environment; marginal eects
reported in case of the probit models; robust standard errors are in parentheses;  denotes
signicance at the 1% level; observations correspond to number of pairs.
variable.26 Table 1 summarizes these ndings.
Our results indicate that the NO environment signicantly reduces the likeli-
hood of equitable outcomes and the uninformed player's payo, with respect to the
informed oeror setting.27 In fact, as a result of the unassignment of the role of
oeror, a lower likelihood of equitable outcomes is observed: 10 v. 28%, for the
NO and IO conditions, respectively. Similarly, the mean payo for the uninformed
players is lower under the NO condition: 389 v. 453, for the NO and IO conditions,
respectively. These unequal outcomes might be attributed to the behavior of oerors
and oerees in the NO - Uninformed Owner environment (23% of the cases): Mode
oer equal to 450, and strategic behavior of informed oerees who decided to sell
when asset values were low (94% of the cases) and to buy when asset values were
high (71% of the cases). These ndings provide strong support to Hypothesis 2.
RESULT 2: The shotgun mechanism with an unassigned oeror decreases the likeli-
hood of equitable outcomes and the mean payo for the uninformed owner (compared
to the shotgun mechanism with an informed oeror).
26The dummy variable takes a value equal to 1 if the observation pertains to the NO condition,
and a value equal to 0 otherwise. The round variable controls for learning eects across rounds.
Data for the NO and IO are pooled (in case of the probit model, the NO data do not include cases
in which neither owner 1 nor owner 2 decided to be the oeror).
27The variable round was not signicant in any model.
114 Conclusion
This article theoretically and experimentally studies shotgun mechanisms in a common-
value setting with one-sided asymmetric information. Our experimental ndings
support our theory regarding the unequal and inecient outcomes under the shot-
gun mechanism with an unassigned oeror. The implementation of the shotgun
mechanism with an informed oeror, possible under ex post judicial resolution of
deadlock, might preclude the occurrence of these undesirable outcomes.
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[Appendix: Instructions IO Condition.] 
PLEASE GIVE THIS MATERIAL TO THE EXPERIMENTER 
AT THE END OF THE SESSION 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Several academic institutions have 
provided the funds for this research.   
In this experiment you will be asked to play an economic decision-making computer game. The 
experiment currency is the “token.” The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and make 
appropriate decisions, you may make an appreciable amount of money.  At the end of the experiment you 
will be paid your total game earnings in CASH along with your participation fee. If you have any questions 
at any time, please raise your hand and the experimenter will go to your desk.  
 
SESSION AND PLAYERS 
The session is made up of 24 rounds. The first 8 rounds are practice rounds and will not be counted in 
the determination of your final earnings.  
 
1)   Before the beginning of each practice round, the computer will randomly form pairs of two people: 
One Player 1 and one Player 2. The roles will be randomly assigned. During the practice rounds, each 
person will play 4 times the roles of Player 1 and Player 2.  
 
2)  After the last practice round, 16 rounds will be played.  
 
-  Every participant will be randomly assigned a role. This ROLE WILL REMAIN THE SAME until 
the end of the session.  
 
-  At the beginning of each round, NEW PAIRS, one Player 1 and one Player 2 will be randomly 
formed.  
 
You will not know the identity of your partner in any round. You know, however, that at the beginning 
of each round, NEW PAIRS of two people, Player 1 and Player 2 will be randomly formed.    2
ROUND STAGES 
 
STAGE 1 
 
1)  Player 1 and Player 2 jointly own a business. Each business partner owns 50% of the initial value of  
the business assets.  
 
2)  The computer randomly determines the initial value of the business assets and reveals this 
information ONLY to Player 1. Player 2 will NOT know the initial value of the business assets until 
the end of the round.  
 
The initial values of the business assets can be any even integer number between 400 tokens and 
1000 tokens. In other words, the initial value of the business assets can be 400 tokens, 402 tokens, …, 
998 tokens, or 1000 tokens. Each value is equally likely. 
 
The Players have no choice over the initial value of the business assets.  
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STAGE 2 
 
1)  Player 1 and Player 2 play a partnership-dissolution game. 
 
-  The business partnership will be dissolved. Then, the value of the business assets will increase by 
200 tokens. 
 
PLAYER 1’S OFFER 
 
2)  Player 1 makes a buy/sell price offer that Player 2 will use to buy Player 1’s share of the business 
assets or to sell his/her share of the business assets to Player 1. Player 1 can choose any price 
greater than or equal to 0 (no decimals). 
 
PLAYER 2’S RESPONSE 
3)    After observing the price offer, Player 2 will decide whether to buy Player 1’s share of the business 
assets at the proposed price, or to sell his/her share of the business assets to Player 1 at the proposed 
price. 
 
-   If Player 2 decides to BUY Player 1’s share of the business assets, Player 2 transfers to Player 1 
an amount of tokens equal to the price proposed. The business partnership is dissolved. Player 2 
is now the sole owner of the business. The GAME ENDS.  
 
Player 1’s payoff = price proposed by Player 1 
Player 2’s payoff = initial value of the business assets + 200 tokens –  price proposed by Player 1 
 
-  If Player 2 decides to SELL his/her share of the business assets to Player 1, Player 1 transfers to 
Player 2 an amount of tokens equal to the price proposed. The business partnership is dissolved. 
Player 1 is now the sole owner of the business. The GAME ENDS.  
 
Player 1’s payoff = initial value of the business assets + 200 tokens – price proposed by Player 1 
Player 2’s payoff = price proposed by Player 1 
   4
ROUND PAYOFF 
The Payoff Table shows the round payoffs for Player 1 and Player 2, under the possible outcomes of 
the partnership-dissolution game. 
 
Payoff Table: PLAYER 1 MAKES A BUY/SELL PRICE OFFER 
  PAYOFFS IF PLAYER 2 DECIDES TO BUY HIS/HER PARTNER’S SHARE OF THE 
BUSINESS ASSETS  
PLAYER 1  price proposed by Player 1 
PLAYER 2  initial value of the business assets + 200 tokens –  price proposed by Player 1 
  PAYOFFS IF PLAYER 2 DECIDES TO SELL HIS/HER SHARE OF THE BUSINESS 
ASSETS TO HIS/HER PARTNER 
PLAYER 1  initial value of the business assets + 200 tokens –  price proposed by Player 1 
PLAYER 2  price proposed by Player 1 
  
  
  
EXERCISES 
Two exercises related to the Payoff Table are presented below. Please fill the blanks. 
Exercise 1.  
Suppose that the initial value of the business assets is C tokens, Player 1 proposes a buy/sell price 
offer equal to U tokens, and Player 2 decides to sell his/her share of the business assets.  Then, Player 1’s 
payoff is equal to ________________________ tokens, and Player 2’s payoff is equal to 
_____________________________ tokens. 
 
 
Exercise 2. 
Suppose that the initial value of the business assets is D tokens, Player 1 proposes a buy/sell price 
offer equal to Y tokens, and Player 2 decides to buy his/her partner’s share of the business assets. Then, 
Player 1’s payoff is equal to ________________________________ tokens, and Player 2’s payoff is equal 
to _____________________________ tokens. 
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SESSION PAYOFF 
The session earnings in tokens will be equal to the sum of payoffs for the 16 rounds. The session 
earnings in dollars will be equal to (session earnings in tokens)/427 (427 tokens = 1 dollar). The total 
earnings in dollars will be equal to the participation fee plus the session earning in dollars.  
 
GAME SOFTWARE 
The game will be played using a computer terminal. You will need to enter your decisions by using 
the mouse. In some instances, you will need to wait until the other players make their decisions before 
moving to the next screen. Please be patient. There will be two boxes, displayed in the upper right-hand side 
of your screen, that indicate the “Round Number” and “Your Role.”    
Press the NEXT >> button to move to the next screen. Please, do not try to go back to the previous 
screen and do not close the browser: The software will stop working and you will lose all the accumulated 
tokens.  
 
Next, the 8 PRACTICE ROUNDS will begin. After that, 16 rounds will be played. You can consult 
these instructions at any time during the session. 
 
THANKS FOR YOUR 
PARTICIPATION IN THIS 
STUDY!! 
PLEASE GIVE THIS MATERIAL TO THE EXPERIMENTER 
AT THE END OF THE SESSION`   1
[Appendix: NO Instructions.] 
PLEASE GIVE THIS MATERIAL TO THE EXPERIMENTER 
AT THE END OF THE SESSION 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Several academic institutions have 
provided the funds for this research.   
In this experiment you will be asked to play an economic decision-making computer game. The 
experiment currency is the “token.” The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and make 
appropriate decisions, you may make an appreciable amount of money.  At the end of the experiment you 
will be paid your total game earnings in CASH along with your participation fee. If you have any questions 
at any time, please raise your hand and the experimenter will go to your desk.  
 
SESSION AND PLAYERS 
The session is made up of 24 rounds. The first 8 rounds are practice rounds and will not be counted in 
the determination of your final earnings.  
 
1)   Before the beginning of each practice round, the computer will randomly form pairs of two people: 
One Player 1 and one Player 2. The roles will be randomly assigned. During the practice rounds, each 
person will play 4 times the roles of Player 1 and Player 2.  
 
2)  After the last practice round, 16 rounds will be played.  
 
-  Every participant will be randomly assigned a role. This ROLE WILL REMAIN THE SAME until 
the end of the session.  
 
-  At the beginning of each round, NEW PAIRS, one Player 1 and one Player 2 will be randomly 
formed.  
 
You will not know the identity of your partner in any round. You know, however, that at the beginning 
of each round, NEW PAIRS of two people, Player 1 and Player 2 will be randomly formed.    2
ROUND STAGES 
 
STAGE 1 
 
1)  Player 1 and Player 2 jointly own a business. Each business partner owns 50% of the initial value of  
the business assets.  
 
2)  The computer randomly determines the initial value of the business assets and reveals this 
information ONLY to Player 1. Player 2 will NOT know the initial value of the business assets until 
the end of the round.  
 
The initial values of the business assets can be any even integer number between 400 tokens and 
1000 tokens. In other words, the initial value of the business assets can be 400 tokens, 402 tokens, …, 
998 tokens, or 1000 tokens. Each value is equally likely. 
 
The Players have no choice over the initial value of the business assets.  
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STAGE 2 
 
1)  Player 1 and Player 2 play a partnership-dissolution game. 
 
-  If the business partnership is dissolved, the value of the business assets increases by 200 tokens. 
 
-  If the business partnership is not dissolved, the value of business assets remains at its initial 
value.  
 
 
DECISION TO BECOME THE OFFEROR 
 
2)  Player 1 and Player 2 simultaneously decide whether they want to become the OFFEROR, i.e., 
whether they want to make a buy/sell price offer to the other player, that the other player will use to 
buy the offeror’s share of the business assets or to sell his/her share of the business assets to the 
offeror.  
 
-  If  BOTH players decide they want to become the OFFEROR, then the computer randomly 
determines which player will become the OFFEROR. Each player has an equal chance of 
becoming the offeror. 
 
-  If only ONE player decides he/she wants to become the OFFEROR, then this player becomes the 
OFFEROR. 
 
-  If NEITHER PLAYER 1 NOR PLAYER 2 decides he/she wants to become the OFFEROR, 
then the business partnership is not dissolved. The GAME ENDS. Each player receives a payoff 
equal to half of the initial value of the business assets. 
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IF PLAYER 1 BECOMES THE OFFEROR 
 
PLAYER 1’S OFFER 
 
3)  Player 1 makes a buy/sell price offer that Player 2 will use to buy Player 1’s share of the business 
assets or to sell his/her share of the business assets to Player 1. Player 1 can choose any price 
greater than or equal to 0 (no decimals). 
 
 
PLAYER 2’S RESPONSE 
4)    After observing the price offer, Player 2 will decide whether to buy Player 1’s share of the business 
assets at the proposed price, or to sell his/her share of the business assets to Player 1 at the proposed 
price. 
 
-   If Player 2 decides to BUY Player 1’s share of the business assets, Player 2 transfers to Player 1 
an amount of tokens equal to the price proposed. The business partnership is dissolved. Player 2 
is now the sole owner of the business. The GAME ENDS.  
 
Player 1’s payoff = price proposed by Player 1 
Player 2’s payoff = initial value of the business assets + 200 tokens –  price proposed by Player 1 
 
-  If Player 2 decides to SELL his/her share of the business assets to Player 1, Player 1 transfers to 
Player 2 an amount of tokens equal to the price proposed. The business partnership is dissolved. 
Player 1 is now the sole owner of the business. The GAME ENDS.  
 
Player 1’s payoff = initial value of the business assets + 200 tokens – price proposed by Player 1 
Player 2’s payoff = price proposed by Player 1 
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IF PLAYER 2 BECOMES THE OFFEROR 
 
PLAYER 2’S OFFER 
 
3)  Player 2 makes a buy/sell price offer that Player 1 will use to buy Player 2’s share of the business 
assets or to sell his/her share of the business assets to Player 2. Player 2 can choose any price 
greater than or equal to 0 (no decimals). 
 
 
PLAYER 1’S RESPONSE 
4)    After observing the price offer, Player 1 will decide whether to buy Player 2’s share of the business 
assets at the proposed price, or to sell his/her share of the business assets to Player 2 at the proposed 
price. 
 
-   If Player 1 decides to BUY Player 2’s share of the business assets, Player 1 transfers to Player 
2 an amount of tokens equal to the price proposed. The business partnership is dissolved. Player 
1 is now the sole owner of the business. The GAME ENDS.  
 
Player 1’s payoff = initial value of the business assets + 200 tokens –  price proposed by Player 2 
Player 2’s payoff = price proposed by Player 2 
 
-  If Player 1 decides to SELL his/her share of the business assets to Player 2, Player 2 transfers to 
Player 1 an amount of tokens equal to the price proposed. The business partnership is dissolved. 
Player 2 is now the sole owner of the business. The GAME ENDS.  
 
Player 1’s payoff = price proposed by Player 2 
Player 2’s payoff = initial value of the business assets + 200 tokens – price proposed by Player 2 
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IF NEITHER PLAYER 1 NOR PLAYER 2 BECOMES THE 
OFFEROR 
 
The GAME ENDS.  
 
Player 1’s payoff = initial value of the business assets/2 
Player 2’s payoff = initial value of the business assets/2 
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ROUND PAYOFF: PLAYER 1 BECOMES THE 
OFFEROR 
The Payoff Table shows the round payoffs for Player 1 and Player 2, under the possible outcomes of 
the partnership-dissolution game. 
 
Payoff Table: PLAYER 1 MAKES A BUY/SELL PRICE OFFER 
  PAYOFFS IF PLAYER 2 DECIDES TO BUY HIS/HER PARTNER’S SHARE OF THE 
BUSINESS ASSETS  
PLAYER 1  price proposed by Player 1 
PLAYER 2  initial value of the business assets + 200 tokens –  price proposed by Player 1 
  PAYOFFS IF PLAYER 2 DECIDES TO SELL HIS/HER SHARE OF THE BUSINESS 
ASSETS TO HIS/HER PARTNER 
PLAYER 1  initial value of the business assets + 200 tokens –  price proposed by Player 1 
PLAYER 2  price proposed by Player 1 
  
  
  
EXERCISES 
Two exercises related to the Payoff Table are presented below. Please fill the blanks. 
Exercise 1.  
Suppose that the initial value of the business assets is C tokens, Player 1 proposes a buy/sell price 
offer equal to U tokens, and Player 2 decides to sell his/her share of the business assets. Then, Player 1’s 
payoff is equal to ________________________ tokens, and Player 2’s payoff is equal to 
_____________________________ tokens. 
 
 
Exercise 2. 
Suppose that the initial value of the business assets is D tokens, Player 1 proposes a buy/sell price 
offer equal to Y tokens, and Player 2 decides to buy his/her partner’s share of the business assets. Then, 
Player 1’s payoff is equal to ________________________________ tokens, and Player 2’s payoff is equal 
to _____________________________ tokens. 
   8
ROUND PAYOFF: PLAYER 2 BECOMES THE 
OFFEROR 
 
The Payoff Table shows the round payoffs for Player 1 and Player 2, under the possible outcomes 
of the partnership-dissolution game. 
 
Payoff Table: PLAYER 2 MAKES A BUY/SELL PRICE OFFER 
  PAYOFFS IF PLAYER 1 DECIDES TO BUY HIS/HER PARTNER’S SHARE OF THE 
BUSINESS ASSETS  
PLAYER 1  initial value of the business assets + 200 tokens –  price proposed by Player 2 
PLAYER 2  price proposed by Player 2 
  PAYOFFS IF PLAYER 1 DECIDES TO SELL HIS/HER SHARE OF THE BUSINESS 
ASSETS TO HIS/HER PARTNER 
PLAYER 1  price proposed by Player 2 
PLAYER 2  initial value of the business assets + 200 tokens –  price proposed by Player 2 
  
  
  
EXERCISES 
Two exercises related to the Payoff Table are presented below. Please fill the blanks. 
Exercise 1.  
Suppose that the initial value of the business assets is C tokens, Player 2 proposes a buy/sell price 
offer equal to W tokens, and Player 1 decides to sell his/her share of the business assets.  Then, Player 1’s 
payoff is equal to ________________________ tokens, and Player 2’s payoff is equal to 
_____________________________ tokens. 
 
 
Exercise 2. 
Suppose that the initial value of the business assets is D tokens, Player 2 proposes a buy/sell price 
offer equal to Z tokens, and Player 1 decides to buy his/her partner’s share of the business assets. Then, 
Player 1’s payoff is equal to ________________________________ tokens, and Player 2’s payoff is equal 
to _____________________________ tokens.   9
ROUND PAYOFF: NEITHER PLAYER 1 NOR 
PLAYER 2 BECOMES THE OFFEROR 
 
The Payoff Table shows the round payoffs for Player 1 and Player 2, under the possible outcomes 
of the partnership-dissolution game.  
 
Payoff Table: NEITHER PLAYER 1 NOR PLAYER 2 DECIDE TO BE THE 
OFFER0R 
Player 1’s payoff = initial value of the business assets/2 
Player 2’s payoff = initial value of the business assets/2 
 
 
EXERCISES 
Two exercise related to the Payoff Table is presented below. Please fill the blanks. 
Exercise 1.  
Suppose that the initial value of the business assets is C tokens. Neither Player 1 nor Player 2 
decide to be the OFFEROR.  Then, Player 1’s payoff is equal to ________________________ tokens, and 
Player 2’s payoff is equal to _____________________________ tokens. 
 
 
Exercise 2.  
Suppose that the initial value of the business assets is D tokens. Neither Player 1 nor Player 2 
decide to be the OFFEROR.  Then, Player 1’s payoff is equal to ________________________ tokens, and 
Player 2’s payoff is equal to _____________________________ tokens. 
 
 
 
   10
SESSION PAYOFF 
The session earnings in tokens will be equal to the sum of payoffs for the 16 rounds. The session 
earnings in dollars will be equal to (session earnings in tokens)/427 (427 tokens = 1 dollar). The total 
earnings in dollars will be equal to the participation fee plus the session earning in dollars.  
 
GAME SOFTWARE 
The game will be played using a computer terminal. You will need to enter your decisions by using 
the mouse. In some instances, you will need to wait until the other players make their decisions before 
moving to the next screen. Please be patient. There will be two boxes, displayed in the upper right-hand side 
of your screen, that indicate the “Round Number” and “Your Role.”    
Press the NEXT >> button to move to the next screen. Please, do not try to go back to the previous 
screen and do not close the browser: The software will stop working and you will lose all the accumulated 
tokens.  
 
Next, the 8 PRACTICE ROUNDS will begin. After that, 16 rounds will be played. You can consult 
these instructions at any time during the session. 
 
THANKS FOR YOUR 
PARTICIPATION IN THIS 
STUDY!! 
PLEASE GIVE THIS MATERIAL TO THE EXPERIMENTER 
AT THE END OF THE SESSION` [Supplementary Material (Not for Publication).]
Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value
Partnerships: The Unassigned-Oeror Problem
Claudia M. Landeoand Kathryn E. Spiery
Appendix
This appendix rst presents the proofs for Proposition 1.1 Second, it includes addi-
tional data material.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
(Informed Oeror) If Owner 1's equilibrium proposal is p1(x) = x+a
2 then Owner 2
is indierent between buying and selling, since Owner 2's payo would be x+a
2 in
either case. Suppose Owner 2 randomizes 50   50 between buying and selling for
all price oers. Suppose that Owner 1 is of type x. Owner 1's expected payo from
oering a price p1 would be 1
2(x+a p1)+ 1
2(p1) = x+a
2 . This is independent of p1 so
Owner 1 of type x is indierent over the level of the oer and oering p1(x) = x+a
2
is therefore incentive compatible. Thus, the strategies for Owner 1 outlined in the
Proposition constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
(Uninformed Oeror) An oer by Owner 2, p2, creates a cuto y = 2p2   a where
Owner 1 sells his stake to Owner 2 for p2 if x < y and Owner 1 buys Owner 2's
stake for p2 if x  y. So Owner 2's problem may be written as choosing the cuto
y and the corresponding price p2 =
y+a
2 to maximize his payo:
Z y
xL
 
x + a  
y+a
2

dF(x) +
Z xH
y
 y+a
2

dF(x):
University of Alberta Economics Department.
yHarvard Law School and NBER.
1These results follow from Propositions 1 and 2 presented in our previous work (Brooks et al.,
2010).
1Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
IO NO
Informed Owner's Price(a) 463 428
(113) (68)
Uninformed Owner's Price(a)   461
  (146)
Informed Owner's Payo 410 445
(138) (144)
Uninformed Owner's Payo 453 389
(132) (125)
Equitable Outcome Rate 28 10
Ineciency Rate 0 24
Asset Value(b) 431 441
(89) (83)
Observations(c) 144 144
Note: (a)Mean prices are presented; (b)mean asset values per owner under ownership
consolidation are presented; (c)sample sizes correspond to the number of pairs for the 16 rounds;
standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
The derivative of this expression with respect to y equals 1
2   F(y). Setting the
derivative equal to zero conrms that y = x and therefore p2 = x+a
2 . Player 2's
payo is
R x
xL (x + a)dF(x) = 1
2E(x + a j x  x). 
ADDITIONAL DATA MATERIAL
Table A1 provides the descriptive statistics.2 Information about the mean prices
and payos for informed and uninformed owners is included. The equitable outcome
rate is dened as the percentage of total pairs involving a 50-50 allocation (i.e., the
uninformed owner's payo is 50% of the sum of payos (for the unassigned-oeror
condition (NO), only consolidated ownership cases, i.e., cases in which one or both
owners decide to be the oeror, are considered). The ineciency rate is dened as
the percentage of total pairs in which inecient joint ownership is preserved (i.e.,
the percentage of total cases in which neither the informed nor the uninformed
owner decided to be the oeror). Mean asset values per owner under ownership
consolidation are presented.3
2Given the consistency of the aggregate data across rounds since early stages, we decided to
include the 16 rounds in our analysis. The qualitative results still hold when only the last 8 rounds
of play are considered. For exposition, rounded values (integers) are presented.
3The asset value dierences between conditions were not statistically signicant.
2